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On February 20, 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Atkins v. Virginia.' In Atkins, the Court created a categorical
exemption from the death penalty for people with mental retardation,
holding that the execution of such individuals violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.! By carving
out this exemption, Atkins placed a significant limit on the power of the
states to execute their own sentences. However, what power Atkins took
from the states with one hand, it gave back to the states with the other.
For in the same opinion, the Supreme Court empowered the states to
determine the standards and procedures to be used in implementing the
newly announced exemption,3 thereby giving the states significant control
over the actual effect of Atkins on executions.
The State of California's primary attempt at implementing Atkins is
Penal Code section 1376. This statute details a comprehensive set of
procedures for state superior courts to use when evaluating requests for
an Atkins exemption. But section 1376 does not apply in every situation
where a request for Atkins relief may be raised. Specifically, section 1376
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005; B.A., University of
California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank John Stanley, Lee Shepard, Kathy Kizer, and Chris
Lockard for their efforts and understanding. Special thanks as well to Andy Sarouhan, Jane Tarbell
and Melinda Jane Tarbell for their inspiration and overwhelming support over the years. All errors are
my own.
I. 536 U.S. 304.
2. Id. at 321.
3. Id. at 317 ("[Wle leave to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences.").
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HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
offers no guidance on how lower courts should address petitions for
Atkins relief by individuals already on death row.
This open question was ultimately resolved by the California
Supreme Court in In re Hawthorne.4 In Hawthorne, Justice Janice R.
Brown, writing for a unanimous court, set forth the specific standards
and procedures to be used in implementing Atkins in the post-conviction
setting, including how a claim of mental retardation should be raised, the
burden of proof, the type of evidence that may be considered in proving
mental retardation, and the entity responsible for determining if mental
retardation exists (i.e., judge or jury).'
However, the most complicated issue dealt with by the court was the
definition of mental retardation.6 The court devoted almost two full
pages of its nine-page opinion to devising an appropriate definition.7 And
it is not surprising the court found the issue to be so challenging. Atkins
itself suggested that the most difficult issue in implementing the newly
announced exemption would likely be determining which individuals
qualified as mentally retarded. A number of mental health law scholars
have subsequently echoed this suggestion.9 For instance, Professor Peggy
M. Tobolowsky has stated, "the most important task for capital
punishment jurisdictions in implementing Atkins is to define the
'mentally retarded offender ....
Despite the issue's complexity, the court eventually arrived at a
definition of mental retardation." The court held that a death row inmate
seeking to prove mental retardation must show (i) significant subaverage
intellectual functioning, (2) deficiencies in adaptive behavior, and (3)
manifestation of these limitations prior to the age of eighteen. The
Hawthorne court derived its definition largely from similar definitions
endorsed by the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR)
and the American Psychiatric Association (APA).'2
This Note argues that the California Supreme Court's definition of
mental retardation and its rationale for that definition exhibit both
strengths and weaknesses. Within the same opinion the court reaches
both correct and incorrect conclusions about how to define mental
retardation. The court's reasoning is both principled and thorough as
4. 35 Cal. 4 th 40 (2005).
5. See id.
6. Id. at 47-49.
7. Id.
8. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
9. See, e.g., Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV.
255, 264-74 (2003).
io. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders and
Excluding Them From Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 86 (2003).
i i. Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th at 48.
12. Id. at 47-48.
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well as arbitrary and incomplete. By identifying the opinion's strengths
this Note will highlight the positive contributions Hawthorne makes to
the current debate on defining mental retardation in cases where Atkins
is invoked.'3 Alternatively, by identifying and correcting some of the
opinion's weaknesses, this Note will help prevent other state courts and
legislatures addressing the definitional issue from falling prey to similar
mistakes.
To this end, this Note proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the
backdrop against which Hawthorne was decided. Specifically, it provides
a brief description of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v.
Virginia and the California Legislature's subsequent attempt at
implementing Atkins in the pre-conviction context (California Penal
Code section 1376). Part II then follows with a detailed description of the
Hawthorne opinion, focusing specifically on the California Supreme
Court's definition of mental retardation. Part III then addresses various
aspects of the court's discussion of how to define mental retardation,
pointing out the opinion's strengths and weaknesses. Part III.A focuses
on the court's implicit decision that it was the appropriate body to decide
how mental retardation should be defined, and Part III.B looks at the
Hawthorne court's explicit choice to adopt a clinical based definition of
mental retardation. Finally, Part III.C of this Note assesses the court's
elaboration of the exact contours of the two essential prongs of mental
retardation: (i) subaverage intellectual functioning and (2) problems in
adaptive behavior.
I. BACKGROUND
A. ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
In Atkins v. Virginia the United States Supreme Court banned the
execution of individuals with mental retardation. 4 According to Justice
Stevens, writing for a five-member majority,'5 the practice of executing
people with mental retardation violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments."' 6 To reach this
conclusion, the Court used a two-part inquiry required by Eighth
Amendment precedent.
The first question addressed by the Court under this inquiry was
whether the execution of people with mental retardation was consistent
13. A number of states are still trying to decide how to define mental retardation in cases where
the Atkins exemption is invoked. See Nava Feldman, Application of the Constitutional Rule of Atkins
v. Virginia That Execution of Mentally Retarded Persons Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment in
Violation of the Eighth Amendment, 122 A.L.R. 5 th i45 (2004).
14. 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002).
15. The other members of the majority included Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer.
16. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
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with the nation's evolving standard of decency. To answer this question,
the Court took notice of how many state legislatures had banned the
practice." The Court noted that all of the recent legislation favored
prohibiting the practice of executing the mentally retarded rather then
permitting it.'
8
The second part of the Court's Eighth Amendment inquiry focused
on whether in its own judgment the practice of imposing capital
punishment against the mentally retarded was cruel and unusual.9 The
Court found two reasons to agree with the nation's consensus that
executing the mentally retarded was cruel and unusual. First, the Court
reasoned that executing the mentally retarded would not serve either of
the traditional purposes of the death penalty. Retribution would not be
served because the mentally retarded suffer from lower levels of
consciousness and are thus less culpable for their crimes." Deterrence
would also not be served because mentally retarded offenders are less
capable of understanding "the possibility of execution as a penalty and,
as a result, control[ling] their behavior based upon that information."'"
Second, the Court found that mentally retarded defendants possessed a
reduced ability to aid in their own defense." For example, a mentally
retarded defendant is more likely to give a false confession, be unable to
offer mitigating evidence, and is less likely to provide meaningful
assistance to counsel.
In sum, the Court rendered an affirmative answer to both parts of
the required Eighth Amendment inquiry. It found that our nation's
evolving standards of decency would not permit the continued execution
of the mentally retarded and that, in its own judgment, the continued use
of the practice was an excessive form of punishment. The Court thus
prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded. 4
However, the creation of a categorical exemption from the death
penalty for the mentally retarded was not the only significant part of the
Atkins opinion. After announcing the exemption, the Supreme Court
stated, "we leave to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to
enforce the constitutional restrictions upon its execution of sentences.2 5
Although this one sentence amounts to only a small portion of the
Court's lengthy opinion, it has proven to be extremely significant. Since
I7. Id. at 312.
i8. Id.
19. Id. at 313.
20. Id. at 319.
21. Id. at 319-2o.
22. Id. at 320.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 321.
25. Id. at 317 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405 (1986)).
[Vol. 56:1249
June 2005] STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES OF HAWTHORNE
Atkins, debate about how to implement the Court's decision has been
just as vigorous as debate about whether the decision was correct."
B. CALIFORNIA'S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE
SECTION 1376
California's first attempt at implementing Atkins came through the
legislative process. In 2003 the California Legislature enacted Penal
Code section 1376, which provides California courts with guidance on a
number of the procedural issues left unresolved by Atkins.27 First, section
1376 offers a definition of mental retardation for use in pre-conviction
cases. Mental retardation is defined as "the condition of significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before the age of I8."2s
Second, the statute addresses how mental retardation should be proven,
requiring that any individual seeking an exemption from the death
penalty first submit a declaration by a qualified psychiatric expert. 9
Third, section 1376 allows the offender to elect either a judge or jury as
the fact-finder.3° Finally, section 1376 mandates that the defendant bear
the burden of proving mental retardation by a preponderance of the
evidence.3
Despite the statute's resolution of so many post-Atkins
implementation issues, its effectiveness is limited. This is because section
1376 only applies in pre-conviction cases where the death penalty is
being sought." In other words, "the statute makes no provision for cases
in which the death penalty has already been imposed. 3 3 As a result, the
task of devising the appropriate standards and procedures for
implementing Atkins in post-conviction cases was left to the California
Supreme Court.
II. INRE HAWTHORNE
The court took up this challenge in the case of In re Hawthorne.'
Hawthorne involved the habeas corpus petition of Anderson Hawthorne,
Jr. (Anderson). Anderson was convicted in 1985 of murdering two
26. See, e.g., Alexis Krulish Dowling, Post-Atkins Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court's
Ban on Executing the Mentally Retarded, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 773 (2003); Note, Implementing
Atkins, i16 HARV. L. REV. 2565 (2003) [hereinafter Implementing Atkins].
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (West 2003). See generally Anthony C. Williams, Review of Selected
2003 California Legislation: Penal Chapter 700: "Too Dumb to Die": Implementing the U.S. Supreme
Court's Ban on Executing the Mentally Retarded, 35 McGEORGE L. REV. 616 (2004).
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(a).
29. Id. § 1376(b)(I).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 1376(b)(2).
32. Id. § 1376(b)(I).
33. In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th 40,45 (2005).
34- Id.
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individuals and attempting to murder several others.35 He was sentenced
to death. Subsequent to his sentencing, Anderson filed at least three
separate habeas petitions arguing that he was mentally retarded and
therefore should be exempt from the ultimate punishment.
In support of his claim, Anderson presented evidence that he had
always exhibited an extremely low level of intellectual functioning.37
Almost all of his IQ tests had resulted in scores between seventy and
seventy-five, which put him in the bottom three percent of overall
intellectual functioning in the population.: Additionally, Anderson
presented credible evidence of serious adaptive behavior problems.
Starting in his early childhood, Anderson had problems reading and
writing, communicating with others, and he was a slow learner.39 Finally,
Anderson provided declarations from two different experts in psychiatry
and neurology who had reviewed his case file and concluded that he was
mentally retarded." One expert was even willing to state that Anderson
was "one of the most profoundly impaired individuals ever seen within a
forensic population.
4 '
Although this evidence would appear persuasive, each of
Anderson's original habeas petitions was denied. 42 The California
Supreme Court summarily denied Anderson's requests for relief based
on the case of Penry v. Lynaugh, which had been issued thirteen years
before Atkins and had determined that execution of the mentally
retarded did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
excessive punishments. 43 But Anderson filed a fourth habeas corpus
petition after Atkins, and the court was thus required to reconsider his
request for an exemption based on mental retardation.
The supreme court granted Anderson's petition and held that he was
entitled to a hearing on whether he should be exempted from the death
penalty.' In doing so the court established a number of standards and
procedures for assessing petitions filed by death row inmates seeking
Atkins relief. For instance, the court announced that mental retardation
claims should be raised through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
should include a declaration by a qualified psychiatric expert stating that
the petitioner was mentally retarded and the basis for that opinion.4 The
35. People v. Hawthorne, 4 Cal. 4th 43, 51 (1992).
36. Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4 th at 43.
37. Id. at 51.




42. Id. at 43.
43. Id. (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
44. Id. at 5i-52.
45- Id. at 47.
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court also held that a judge, not a jury, should answer the question of
whether the inmate was mentally retarded.46
However, the lengthiest discussion in Hawthorne was devoted to the
topic of defining mental retardation. To begin its discussion, the supreme
court made the implicit decision that it was the appropriate body to
decide how mental retardation should be defined.47 Having made this
choice, the court turned to the question of whether it should adopt a
definition of mental retardation already endorsed by the medical
community. Ultimately the court decided to adopt a clinical based
definition, finding support in the U.S. Supreme Court's references to this
type of definition in Atkins. 8 Accordingly, the court announced that its
definition would be composed of three clinically recognized prongs: (I)
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, (2) deficiencies in
adaptive behavior, and (3) manifestation of these limitations before the
age of eighteen.49 Finally, the court detailed the exact contours of the first
two prongs. With regards to the intellectual functioning prong, the court
declined to establish a fixed IQ requirement."0 Instead it indicated that
any evidence relating to subaverage intellectual functioning should be
considered.' As for the adaptive behavior prong, the court set forth a
specific list of areas the petitioner would have to show were deficient,
including communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community
use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, and work. 2
With this discussion in mind, Justice Chin, joined by Justice
Kennard, wrote a concurring opinion focusing on the majority's
definition of mental retardation. 3 Initially Justice Chin expressed
agreement with the majority's decision not to set an express minimum IQ
requirement. However, he also concluded that lower courts should rarely
find an offender mentally retarded if any of his or her IQ scores were
above the seventy to seventy-five range. 4
III. UNDERSTANDING HAWTHORNE: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Initial reactions to the mental retardation definition announced by
the Hawthorne court have been mixed. Some members of the legal
community have characterized the court's discussion as well-reasoned
and believe that an appropriate definition was chosen.55 Other
46. Id. at 49.
47. See id. at 47.
48. Id. at 47-48.
49. Id. at 48.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 49.
52. Id. at 47-49-
53. Id. at 52-53 (Chin, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 52 (Chin, J., concurring).
55. See Mike McKee, California Supreme Court Applies Retardation Criteria to Death Row
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commentators have been less receptive to the court's definition. 6
Both sides may be correct. The Hawthorne court's discussion of how
to define mental retardation has both strengths and weaknesses. In some
instances the court arrived at the correct conclusion, but did so with
insufficient analysis, while in other instances, the court engaged in more
thorough and principled analysis, but ultimately reached the wrong
conclusion. To support this argument, this Part examines each of the
three major components of the court's definitional discussion, including:
(I) who should decide how mental retardation should be defined (court
or legislature), (2) what type of definition should be adopted (clinical or
legal), and (3) how an inmate should prove the two primary elements of
mental retardation- subaverage intelligence and deficient adaptive
skills. With regards to each component, this Part looks first at the court's
reasoning and then at the court's conclusion.
A. WHICH ENTITY DECIDES: COURT OR LEGISLATURE
The first component of the court's discussion on defining mental
retardation involved the question of which entity should decide the
issue.57 Ultimately the Hawthorne court decided that it was the
appropriate body to define mental retardation for purposes of assessing
post-conviction Atkins claims.
I. Reasoning Assessment
In announcing this conclusion, the court engaged in completely
deficient reasoning. In fact, the supreme court offered no reasoning at all
for why it was the appropriate body to decide the definitional issue. This
failure is problematic given the existence of at least two arguments in
favor of the court deferring the issue to the legislature.
First, nothing in Atkins indicates that state courts should address
how the mental retardation exemption should be implemented. The only
relevant statement made by the Supreme Court was that it was leaving
"to the States" the task of enforcing the new constitutional ban on
execution of the mentally retarded 5 There is no indication that the
Court intended "to the States" to mean state courts, as opposed to state
legislatures. In fact there may be evidence to the contrary. As discussed
above, in determining whether a national consensus had developed
against executing the mentally retarded, the Supreme Court looked to
state legislatures and not to state courts.59 The Hawthorne court failed to
Inmates, THE RECORDER, Feb. 14,2005, at Ai.
56. See Press Release, Criminal Justice Law Foundation, California Supreme Court Announces
Rules for Retardation Claims in Death Penalty Cases (Feb. so, 2004) , available at http://www.cjlf.org/
releases/o5-o5.htm.
57. Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4 th at 46-47.
58. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,317 (2002) (emphasis added, textual alteration omitted).
59. Id.
1Vo1. 56:1249
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even mention this fact.
The court also failed to address the fact that a number of other state
courts had already found deference to their states' legislatures
appropriate in dealing with Atkins implementation issues. 6 According to
many of these courts, a court's job is to interpret the law, not make it.
6'
For example, in People v. Pulliam, the defendant, a death row inmate,
filed a post-conviction habeas petition seeking to have her conviction
overturned and her death sentence mitigated. One of her grounds for
requesting relief was that she was mentally retarded.6' The defendant
essentially claimed that after Atkins the state's enforcement of her death
sentence would violate the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court of
Illinois agreed with the defendant's claim and remanded her case so that
a hearing on her mental retardation status could be conducted. 64
However, the court chose not to establish any permanent standards or
procedures for resolving any similar claims going forward. According to
the court, to do so would usurp the authority of the state legislature.
65
The establishment of such standards and procedures was a task best left
"to the determination of the legislature following discussion and
debate."66 The Hawthorne court's failure to address Pulliam, or any case
like it, casts serious doubt on the validity of the court's conclusion that it
was the appropriate body to define mental retardation.
2. Conclusion Assessment
Despite the dearth of reasoning in this area, the California Supreme
Court ultimately arrived at the correct conclusion that it was the
appropriate body to decide how mental retardation should be defined.
Although not mentioned, at least three justifications support the court's
choice.
First, the court might have argued that it was required to decide how
mental retardation would be defined as part of its general obligation to
give effect to every right secured by the federal Constitution." If the
court had circumvented the definitional issue, many death row inmates
might have been unable to take full advantage of the death penalty
exemption announced in Atkins. Such a scenario occurred quite often in
the immediate wake of the Atkins decision.6 Because most state trial
6o. E.g., People v. Pulliam, 206 Ill. 2d 218 (2002); State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835 (2002); In re
Perkins v. State, 851 So. 2d 453 (2002).
6i. See, e.g., Pulliam, 206 Ill. 2d at 260.
62. Id. at 223-24.
63. Id. at 234-36, 257-60.
64. Id. at 257.
65. Id. at 260.
66. Id.
67. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 (935).
68. See, e.g., Pulliam, 206 I11. 2d at 260; Feldman, supra note 13, § 7.
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courts were not given a precise definition with which to assess requests
for Atkins relief, they simply reviewed the original case file to make sure
that basic due process review standards had been met.69 A slew of
mentally retarded inmates were thus prevented from obtaining relief
because their original claims had been given basic due process review.
In California this result would have been unacceptable. It has long
been recognized that the courts of California have an inherent duty to
ensure that each individual has the ability to take full advantage of the
rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution, in this case the right to be
exempt from the death penalty based on a valid claim of mental
retardation.7" The Mississippi Supreme Court articulated similar
reasoning in justifying its decision to define mental retardation in post-
conviction cases.7 ' As that court stated, "in order to fulfill [the court's]
obligation to safeguard every guarantee of the constitution [the court]
must address the Atkins decision, the definition of mental retardation to
be used in our courts, and the procedure to be used for Atkins claims.
72
A second justification in favor of the court's conclusion is provided
by the judiciary's unique role in habeas corpus cases. Because the
California Constitution provides the judicial branch with original
jurisdiction over claims raised by habeas corpus petition, courts possess
the inherent power to decide how these petitions will be resolved.73
Particularly in cases where fundamental constitutional rights are at issue,
the courts have no duty to defer to the legislature on the standards and
procedures used to assess claims raised by individuals via habeas
petition. 74 This principle is perhaps best described by the California
Court of Appeal in Scott v. Larson.75 In that case the petitioner filed a
habeas corpus petition seeking to take advantage of a newly discerned
constitutional right.76 Although the legislature had provided no
procedures for addressing the petitioner's new claim, the court held:
Human Rights are not to be... frittered away or utterly destroyed....
The failure of [the legislature] to perform its duty in arranging and
providing for a detail in connection with a broader and more
comprehensive privilege should work no injury or prejudice to nor
lessen the right for which special constitutional provision had been
made. In the absence of legislative provision therefor, the courts have
inherent power to regulate the practice and to provide [a procedure]
69. Pulliam, 206 I11. 2d at 260.
70. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 141 (197).
71. Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1023 (20o4).
72. Id.
73. E.g., People v. Jordan, 65 Cal. 644 (1884).
74- ld.; accord Valdes v. Cory, i39 Cal. App. 3d 773 (1983); Citizens Utils. Co. v. Superior Court
of Santa Cruz County, 59 Cal. 2d 805 (1963).
75. 82 Cal. App. 46 (1927).
76. Id. at 49-50.
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for every just want relative to the procedure before them.'
This principle justifies the court's actions in Hawthorne. In deciding that
it was the appropriate body to define mental retardation, the court
should have stated that it was merely exercising its broad authority to
establish those standards and procedures needed to resolve a
constitutional claim raised by habeas corpus petition.
A third reason for concluding that the Hawthorne court's decision to
define mental retardation was the correct one is rooted in practicality
and compassion. At the time Hawthorne was announced, there were at
least thirty men on California's death row who had already claimed they
were mentally retarded. And national statistics suggest that the actual
number suffering from the condition could even be higher. 8 To wait for
the slow deliberative process of the legislature to establish the
procedures that should be used to address the claims of so many inmates
would have been impractical and uncompassionate. This was the
reasoning advanced by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex Parte
Briseno.79 Like Hawthorne, the court in that case was confronted with the
task of establishing specific standards and procedures to be used by
Texas state courts in addressing post-conviction requests for Atkins
relief."' Noting that at least thirty-five men on death row had already
made claims of mental retardation, the court held that it could not wait
for the legislature to provide the appropriate guidance."' The court
summarized its reasoning by stating:
The Texas Legislature has not yet enacted legislation to carry out the
Atkins mandate. Nonetheless, this Court must now deal with a
significant number of pending habeas corpus applications claiming that
the death row inmate suffers from mental retardation and thus is
exempt from execution. Recognizing that "justice delayed is justice
denied" to the inmate, to the victims and their families, and to society
at large, we must act during this legislative interregnum to provide
bench and bar with ... judicial guidelines in addressing Atkins claims.
Thus, we [choose] to set out the labove described] judicial standards
for courts considering such claims.
The California Supreme Court might have offered a similar
justification for its decision to establish a definition for mental
retardation in Hawthorne. To the thirty or more men on California's
death row claiming mental retardation, waiting for the legislature to
decide important issues needed for resolution of their claims would have
77. Id. at 50-51.
78. Hudson Sangree, Justices Say Retardation is More than IQ, S.F. DAILY J., Feb. iH, 2005, at 5;
Tobolowsky, supra note 10, at i2o.
79. 135 S.W. 3 d 1, 5 & n.7 (2004).
go. Id. at 4.




B. WHAT TYPE OF DEFINrITON: CLINICAL OR LEGAL?
The second component of the court's discussion defining mental
retardation concerned the issue of whether the definition should be
clinical or legal in nature. Justice Brown, writing for the majority,
eventually decided to adopt a clinical based definition. As such, any
death row inmate seeking an Atkins exemption must prove each of three
clinically recognized prongs: (I) significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning, (2) deficiencies in adaptive behavior, and (3) manifestation
of these limitations before the age of eighteen.
I. Reasoning Assessment
As was the case with the Hawthorne court's conclusion that it should
define mental retardation, Justice Brown's decision to adopt a clinical
based definition is plagued by insufficient reasoning. The court's primary
rationale for making this choice was the Supreme Court's reference to
this type of definition in Atkins."' While this rationale may lend some
support to the court's choice, exclusive reliance on it was inappropriate.
There are a number of reasons to doubt the wisdom of adopting a purely
clinical based definition, none of which were discussed by the court.
To start with, the level of functioning needed to meet the medical
community's concept of mental retardation might not coincide with the
level of functioning a majority of Californian's would say is necessary.
Because the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins was based on exempting
only those offenders with mental retardation around whom a general
"consensus" had formed, it is the citizenry's conceptualization of mental
retardation that should govern the issue." The court in Ex Parte Briseno
expressed this sentiment exactly when it stated "we ... must define
mental retardation [according] to that level and degree at which a
consensus of Texas citizens would agree that a person should be
exempted from the death penalty."8 Noting that in Texas, a consensus
had not yet formed around all those persons whom the mental health
83. In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4 th 40, 47 (2005). Some might contend that the supreme court also
adopted a clinical based definition in order to be consistent with the clinical based definition already
adopted by the Legislature in pre-conviction cases. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (West 2003);
Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th at 47-48. 1 agree that consistency might have played a factor in the court's
choice of a definition of mental retardation endorsed by the medical community, but I do not agree in
this context that the court's aim was to be consistent with California's Legislature. I believe the only
reason the court cited the Legislature's definition was that it too cited Atkins's references to the
AAMR and APA definitions, thus offering further support for the court's own judgment that it should
be consistent with what was announced in Atkins.
84. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-i6 (2002). Other authors raised the concern that state
courts may be apt to adopt a clinical based definition of mental retardation that is inconsistent with a
definition their citizenry would endorse. E.g., Implementing Atkins, supra note 26, at 2570.
85. Id.
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profession might diagnose as mentally retarded, the court adopted a
definition slightly different than what is currently endorsed by the
medical community.
The situation confronting the court in Hawthorne was no different.
There was virtually no evidence that a consensus among the citizens of
California had developed in favor of a purely clinical model of mental
retardation. In fact there is some evidence to the contrary. The
California legislature chose to adopt a definition of mental retardation in
pre-conviction cases slightly different than what is endorsed by the
AAMR and the APA. If the legislature reflects the consensus of the
citizenry (as Atkins suggests), then Hawthorne may have been wrong to
adopt a purely clinical definition. But more importantly, by not
addressing this issue the court's reasoning in this area was left wanting.
A related concern ignored by Hawthorne is the difference in goals
between the mental health and legal communities in defining mental
retardation. The primary goal for clinicians has been to arrive at a
definition that reflects the new view of mental retardation as an
"offshoot of a set of environmental interactions," rather than an
immutable disorder8' Thus, definitions endorsed by the medical
community have moved away "from the labeling of individuals towards
the [flexible] description of the person and his or her needs for
support."8 This may be inconsistent with the type of definition sought by
the legal community. Lawyers and judges are likely to prefer a bright line
definition that will capture the exact person identified as being less
culpable and deterrable by the Supreme Court in Atkins."' From the
perspective of the legal system, "the [focus] is not, what help does this
person need to attain a normal and fulfilling life, but rather, is this person
impaired enough to escape execution for his crimes."'" Given this
unresolved tension between the mental health and legal communities the
court's adoption of a purely clinical based definition may not have been
an appropriate choice.
The final basis for finding the court's reasoning here insufficient is
86. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376. For example, the latest AAMR definition includes broad
categorical areas where the individual's cognitive limitations and behavioral problems should manifest
themselves. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORT 8o (ioth ed. 2002) [hereinafter AAMR MANUAL] ("Mental
Retardation is a disability characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and
in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.") (emphasis
added). The definition adopted by the California Legislature does not conform to this list.
87. See Robert L. Schalock et al., The Changing Conception of Mental Retardation: Implications
for the Field, 32 MENTAL RETARDATION I81, t82 (1994); see also Implementing Atkins, supra note 26, at
2577 (citing Schalock et al).
88. Schalock et al., supra note 87, at 183.
89. See Implementing Atkins, supra note 26, at 2577.
9o. Id.
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that courts have routinely constructed their own definitions of legally
relevant mental health terms without relying on the medical profession."
A primary example is the Supreme Court's definition of the term
"competent." In the many cases where the word "competent" is legally
relevant (e.g., competency to stand trial, competency to refuse
treatment) the Court has chosen to develop its own definition.92 For
example, in the case of competency to stand trial, the Supreme Court
adopted a non-clinical based definition of "competency," stating that
competency means "whether [the individual] has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
understanding-and whether [the individual] has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him."'93 Some have
argued that this definition of competency might be completely different
than what a clinician would endorse.' For example, a clinician may
classify someone as incompetent regardless of his or her ability to
communicate with a lawyer, preferring instead to focus on the person's
psychiatric diagnosis or on a combination of the individual's present
mental state and the type of charges being faced.9" Given this fact, it is
not a priori that the court in Hawthorne should have relied exclusively on
the medical community to define mental retardation. At the very least
the court should have addressed this issue in explaining why it chose to
adopt a clinical based definition.
2. Conclusion Assessment
Even with holes in the court's reasoning, the decision to adopt a
clinical based definition of mental retardation was the correct one. Like
the court's decision to take on the task of defining mental retardation, a
number of unarticulated rationales support the court's decision to use a
clinical based definition. Three in particular are worth mentioning.
First, the court might have explained that adoption of a purely
clinical definition was required by the Supreme Court's holding in
Atkins. In that case the Court stated that its death penalty exemption
would extend only to those defendants who "f[e]ll within in the range of
mentally retarded offenders about whom there [was] a national
consensus. The current national consensus seems focused on the use of
a purely clinical definition of mental retardation. More than twenty-five
91. E.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,402 (196o).
92. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (975); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
93. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
94. C.f Richard J. Bonnie, The Competency of Defendants with Mental Retardation to Assist in
Their Own Defense, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETARDATION 10O-O1 (Conley et al.
eds., 1994) [hereinafter Bonnie, Assist in Their Own Defense].
95. See id. at Ioi; Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky
and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539,540-49 (1993) [hereinafter Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Dropel.
96. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,317 (2002).
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of the thirty-six97 states permitting the death penalty have adopted a
purely clinical definition. Since our state legislatures are presumed to
reflect the will of the state citizenry, any court attempting to define
mental retardation should have to comply with this consensus and adopt
a purely clinical definition." In order to be consistent with Atkins, the
Hawthorne court was arguably required to adopt a purely legal
definition."°
Another argument supporting the court's conclusion is that adoption
of a clinical based definition helps to promote the uniform application of
the death penalty, an objective the Supreme Court has held is essential to
the continued use of the ultimate punishment.' Because most states
implementing Atkins have adopted clinical based definitions of mental
retardation,' 2 the Hawthorne court's adoption of a similar definition
would help to ensure that inmates will not be subject to death in one
jurisdiction but only a life sentence in another.
For instance, Anderson Hawthorne, Jr. will likely be able to prove
each of the three prongs of the clinical based definition adopted by the
California Supreme Court. His very low IQ scores are good evidence of a
significant impairment in intellectual functioning and his problems in
learning, communicating, and other basic skills suggest he possesses the
requisite limits in adaptive behavior. Moreover, each of these
deficiencies was observable before the age of eighteen. If these traits
meet the test set forth in Hawthorne, they probably also satisfy the
clinical based tests adopted in other states. Thus, Anderson would likely
receive the same punishment in each state. If Hawthorne had not
adopted a definition of mental retardation endorsed by the mental health
community, this uniform result would not have been achieved.
A final justification for the court's decision to adopt a clinical based
97. Although thirty-eight states had permitted the imposition of the death penalty for some years,
the New York and Kansas death penalty statutes were declared unconstitutional in 2004, thus bringing
the number down to thirty-six. Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Information (20o5),
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state.
98. Tobolowsky, supra note 10, at 89-93.
99. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-17.
too. Opponents of this analysis might argue that this proposition is inconsistent with my argument
that one of the weaknesses in the court's opinion is its failure to address the possibility that a
consensus has not developed in California surrounding a clinical based definition. See supra notes 84-
85 and accompanying text. However, I think this argument proves too much. While I did argue that a
California consensus had perhaps not developed around a clinical based definition, I did not argue that
a national consensus had not formed around one. As to this proposition it seems there is no doubt.
Ioi. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (972); cf
Jennifer H. van Dulmen-Krantz, The Changing Face of the Death Penalty in America: The Strengths
and Weaknesses of Atkins v. Virginia and Policy Considerations for States Reacting to the Supreme
Court's Eighth Amendment Interpretation, 24 HAMLINE J. PUa. L. & POL'Y r85 (2002).
102. See Tobolowsky, supra note 10, at 89-93.
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definition is one already set forth in the Hawthorne opinion"-the
numerous references to clinical based definitions by the Supreme Court
in Atkins. 4 That the high court chose to rely so heavily on these
definitions provides a persuasive argument that a state should use a
similar definition in defining which offenders may take advantage of the
Atkins holding. 5 With so many references, the Supreme Court arguably
sent a signal that it did not want states to extend the Atkins exemption to
any individual outside the narrow band of offenders who may properly
be classified as mentally retarded according to the AAMR or APA.' °
However, in offering this justification the Hawthorne court did not
go far enough. Not only were clinical based definitions endorsed in
Atkins, they were also endorsed by the Supreme Court in its first
decision dealing with mental retardation and the death penalty, Penry v.
Lynaugh."'° Although the Supreme Court split five to four in that case in
favor of allowing execution of mentally retarded individuals, the court
unanimously agreed that the relevant definition for mental retardation
was the one endorsed by the AAMR.'" 8 When considered in conjunction
with the other justifications described above, the court's consistent
reliance on definitions endorsed by the APA and AAMR provides
strong evidence that the Hawthorne court made the correct choice in
defining mental retardation in post-conviction cases based on a clinical
model.
C. How TO PROVE SUBAVERAGE INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING AND
DEFICIENCIES IN ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR
The third and final aspect of the supreme court's discussion of the
definition of mental retardation in post-conviction Atkins cases concerns
Justice Brown's elaboration of how an inmate is to prove the two
essential prongs of mental retardation-subaverage intellectual
functioning and problems in adaptive behavior. While earlier
components of the court's discussion may have exhibited the
combination of insufficient reasoning but correct conclusions, the court's
discussion here reflects the opposite. In discussing the showing that must
be made for each prong, the court displays highly sophisticated and well-
supported reasoning, but eventually reaches incorrect conclusions.
103. In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th 40,47 (2005).
104. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 & n.3,317-i8.
1o5. See Tobolowsky, supra note 10, at 87 ("These references to [clinical based definitions] in ...
Atkins... provide guidance to the states regarding the Court's understanding of the category of
offenders covered by its ruling[] .... ").
io6. See James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative
Issues, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILrrY L. REP. I, 12 (2OO3), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/MREllisLeg.pdf.
107. 492 U.S. 302,335 (1989).
o8. Id. at 308; Tobolowsky, supra note 10, at 87.
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I. Subaverage Intellectual Functioning
With respect to the intellectual functioning prong of its definition,
the supreme court held that any and all evidence of subaverage
intelligence should be considered.'" In doing so it eschewed setting a
single fixed IQ score necessary to qualify an individual as mentally
retarded, an approach adopted in a number of other states implementing
Atkins."' However, Justice Chin's concurrence also seemed to set a
general IQ range of seventy to seventy-five above which someone
seeking to qualify as mentally retarded cannot fall."'
a. Reasoning Assessment
In defining the intellectual functioning prong in this way (as opposed
to setting a fixed IQ score) the supreme court offered three separate
rationales, each thoroughly supported and well-reasoned.
Inconsistency with the Legislature: First, the court held that adoption
of a fixed IQ cutoff would be inconsistent with the state legislature's
approach to defining subaverage intellectual functioning."2 According to
Justice Brown, the California Legislature made no mention of any
minimum IQ requirement when it passed Penal Code § 1376, and thus
neither would the court."3 The court's instinct to adopt a definition
consistent with that of the state legislature is well-reasoned. As the
Atkins court itself noted (and as I have mentioned before), the
Constitution only prohibits execution of those mentally retarded
individuals whom a national consensus indicates should be exempt, and
the state legislatures form the foundation of this national consensus. '
Arguably then, to ensure that an exemption is only granted to those
offenders outlined by Atkins, a court attempting to define mental
retardation must ensure consistency with the definitions already adopted
by its state legislature. To choose otherwise would allow the judiciary to
grant an exemption to an individual outside the scope of the Atkins
holding. Thus the Hawthorne court's legislative inconsistency rationale
for not adopting a fixed IQ cutoff was persuasive.
Clinical Disfavor.- A second rationale offered by Hawthorne was the
increasing disfavor among members of the medical community with the
use of IQ tests in the legal context."5 This rationale is also thoroughly
supported.'
to9. In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th 40,49 (2003).
Ito. Id. at 48 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3 I-ioA-2.I
(LexisNexis 2003)).
iii. Id. at 52 (Chin, J., concurring).
112. Id. at49.
113. Id.
114. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,31 -i6 (2002).
ii5. Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4 th at 48.
116. E.g., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (APA) TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE,
1265
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
For instance, numerous mental health professionals have argued that
the fundamental purpose of the IQ test is at odds with how it is currently
being used in the legal setting."7 According to clinicians, the purpose of
the IQ test is to provide "a rough approximation" of a person's
intellectual functioning."8 Thus, under most tests an "individual with an
IQ of 72 may not differ substantively from an individual with an IQ score
of 68.."I". Yet in many states a person's IQ score is being used as a fixed
cut-off point, with those at or below the score being classified as mentally
retarded and exempt from the death penalty and those slightly above
being defined as not mentally retarded and thus suitable for the ultimate
punishment.' According to mental health professionals, bright-line IQ
cutoffs are unwarranted. Because the purpose of the test is only to
provide a rough approximation of an individual's intellectual functioning,
"there will always be a large number of persons just above any arbitrary
cutoff point who differ only in minor ways from persons below the cutoff,
and whose [right to exemption] will be just as valid ..... Given this
fundamental proposition, clinicians have argued that states are not
justified in overemphasizing the IQ test in assessing intellectual
functioning for Atkins purposes.
Clinicians also contend that the history and development of the 10
test prove that it is not intended for heavy use by the legal system.' As
Professor Davis has explained, appellate courts and legislatures who rely
on IQ scores as indications of mental retardation should be aware that
they may be placing their faith in a diagnostic instrument that was never
intended to be used in a legal context. 3 The original IQ test, Davis
notes, was developed in France in the early I900s. The test was intended
to be used in elementary schools to determine whether young Parisian
children should be receiving special education services.2 4 A few years
later, the test's questions were altered and clinicians in the United States
began to adopt it. The first use of the 10 test by American psychiatrists
INTELLIGENCE: KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS (1995), available at http://www.lrainc.com/swtaboo/
taboos/apa_oI.html [hereinafter APA TASK FORCE REPORT]; John J. McGee & Frank J. Menolascino,
The Evaluation of Defendants With Mental Retardation in the Criminal Justice System, in THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 94, at 64; John H. Noble, Jr. &
Ronald W. Conley, Toward an Epidemiology of Relevant Attributes, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
AND MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 94, at I; Mossman, supra note 9, at 265-71.
117. Id.
118. Noble & Conley, supra note 116, at 21.
119. Id.
120. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (West 2003).
121. Noble & Conley, supra note 116, at 21.
122. LaJuana Davis, Death Penalty Appeals and Post-Conviction Proceedings: Intelligence Testing
and Atkins: Considerations for Appellate Courts and Appellate Lawyers, 5 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS
297,312-21 (2003).
123. Id. at 312.
124. Id. at 313 .
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was on Ellis Island. The test was used to determine which immigrants
should be denied admission into the country.'25 During World War I the
IQ test was again reconfigured. The United States Army began using the
test as a means of classifying enlistees for different duty assignments.26
From there, the IQ test has been used for a variety of other medical
classification and social service purposes, but rarely has it been used in
the legal context.'27 Based on this history, Professor Davis has contended
that lawyers and judges "must resist the temptation to seek easy answers
from IQ tests; history demonstrates that those tests are not designed to
provide the sort of assessments critical in the life or death circumstances
of capital litigation......
Finally, the most persuasive argument put forth by mental health
professionals against heavy reliance on IQ tests is the extreme cultural
bias found in most tests.' 9 According to clinicians, this bias is not
intentional, but instead reflects the fact that the questions and scales that
form the foundation of modern IQ tests were not developed using non-
white subjects.'30 As a result many IQ tests consistently underestimate
the intellectual functioning of minorities.'' Thus, if a state were to adopt
an exclusively IQ-based assessment, a criminal defendant may be granted
or denied an Atkins exemption based simply on his or her race (or
cultural background), rather then on his or her true mental capacity. A
biased test such as this one should arguably never be used in any legal
setting.
Taken together, these three arguments more then substantiate
Justice Brown's reasoning that a fixed IQ requirement is medically
disfavored.
Imprecision: The third and final rationale offered by the court in
support of its decision not to adopt a fixed IQ cutoff is the imprecise
nature of the test.'32 Like the others mentioned above, this rationale is
verifiable and well-supported. Clinicians have consistently pointed out
that a number of other factors, besides cognitive ability, may affect an
individual's test results.'33 For example, psychiatrists have suggested that
125. Id. at 314.
126. Id. at 317-i8.
127. See History of Intelligence Testing (2003), at http://www.iqtest.comlhistory.html.
128. Id. at 323.
129. E.g., APA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 116, at IO; Noble & Conley, supra note 116, at 2I;
Implementing Atkins, supra note 26 at 2574-75; Susan Du Plessis & Jan Strydom, IQ Test: Where Does
It Come From and What Does it Measure (Learning Disabilities Online 2005), at
http://www.audiblox2ooo.comdyslexia-dyslexic/dyslexiao14.html.
130. Davis, supra note 122, at 130-31. See generally Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal.
1979).
13. E.g., Noble & Conley, supra note 116, at 21.
132. In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th 40,48-49 (2005).
133. See Jane Nelson Hall, Correctional Services for Inmates with Mental Retardation, in CRIMINAL
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a high IQ score may be explained by the fact that the individual has
already taken the test."' The inability to control such external factors
makes a precise measurement of a person's IQ based solely on cognitive
ability alone impossible. In addition to these external problems, mental
health professionals have highlighted a number of intrinsic factors that
may affect the test's precision. In particular they have focused on the
built-in margin of error inherent to every IQ test.3 ' Virtually every IQ
test has between a three- and five-point margin of error. 36 In a state with
a fixed IQ cutoff, this margin of error could result in someone being
unjustly denied a death penalty exemption. With this type of support, the
Hawthorne court's use of imprecision as a rationale for not adopting a
fixed IQ score seems justified.
b. Conclusion Assessment
Given this well-reasoned and persuasive discussion, one would think
that Hawthorne would have rejected any type of fixed IQ requirement.
Instead, however, the Hawthorne court ultimately decided to set a
general IQ range (between seventy and seventy-five) in defining
subaverage intellectual functioning for Atkins purposes.31  This
conclusion was unjustified.
Identical to a Cutoff: To start, all of the rationales identified by the
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 95, at 174-75; Adam Uptak, Rising IQ Scores
May Mean Death for Inmate, S.F. DAILY J., Feb. 9, 2005, at 4.
134- Id.; Alan S. Kaufman, Practice Effects (2003), available at http://www.psychologicalforum.
comarticles.
135. Implementing Atkins, supra note 26, at 2574.
136. Id.
137. In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th 40, 52 (2005) (Chin, J., concurring). The immediate response
most readers of this article are likely to have is, "Wait, that is not the majority's holding. The IQ range
was only discussed in Justice Chin's concurring opinion and thus does not represent the binding
authority of the court." See People v. Superior Court (Persons), 56 Cal. App. 3d 191, 194 (1976). While
I agree with this argument in theory, I do not agree with it in practice. I argue instead that there are a
number of reasons that we should treat Justice Chin's IQ range as part of the opinion of the court.
First, it is not uncommon for "inferior" courts to treat the concurring opinions of "superior" courts as
binding authority. See generally Igor Kirman, Note, Standing Apart to be Apart: The Precedential Value
of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1995). This is especially true in cases
where the concurring opinion is not inconsistent with the majority. Id. That is certainly true in
Hawthorne. There is nothing directly inconsistent between Justice Chin's concurring opinion and
Justice Brown's majority opinion. See Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th at 43-53. Second, the temptation to treat
a concurring opinion as part of the majority is particularly strong where the concurring opinion offers
an explanation for a very difficult topic set forth in the majority. Kirman, supra, at 2085. This is also
true in Hawthorne. The majority's holding only explains that all evidence of intellectual functioning
should be considered, a seemingly very difficult standard for lower courts to apply. Hawthorne, 35 Cal.
4th at 49. Alternatively, Justice Chin's IQ range provides something for lower courts to hang on to, an
easy standard to apply when determining if someone has subaverage intellectual functioning. Cf
People v. Vidal, 124 Cal. App. 4th 806, 848-49 (2004) (holding that IQ is essential for proving
subaverage intellectual functioning in a pre-conviction case even though California Penal Code section
1376 makes no mention of IQ scores). For these reasons I believe it is appropriate to treat Justice
Chin's IQ range as one of the conclusions established by the Hawthorne opinion.
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court for not adopting a single 10 cutoff are equally applicable to a fixed
IQ range. First, the adoption of an IQ range is inconsistent with the state
legislature's approach to intellectual functioning, as expressed in section
I376.' 3s As noted above, California's statute, consistent with most other
states' mental retardation statutes, makes no mention of an IQ range.'39
Consequently, the court may have narrowed the category of offenders
who should be eligible for a death penalty exemption according to our
national consensus, a result which undermines the entire foundation of
the Atkins decision.'4" Second, clinicians might disfavor the adoption of a
fixed 10 range as much they did the adoption of a single score cutoff.'4'
Adoption of a range does not remedy the fact that IQ scores are
generally not suited for use in the legal system.'42 For example, a mentally
retarded offender may receive an IQ score above this range not because
of his true intellectual functioning, but instead because of the inherent
cultural bias of the test.'43 Finally, the test's precision problems also argue
against the court's adoption of a seventy to seventy-five IQ range. While
use of an IQ range may alleviate some precision problems associated
with the test, it cannot alleviate all of them. Modern IQ tests simply
cannot control all of the external factors that might affect, with varying
degrees of severity, an individual's score." The supreme court would
have had to adopt a range much larger than five points to accommodate
all of the external factors that might affect the precision of an individual's
score.
Problems with the Chosen Range: Even if Hawthorne's earlier
reasoning did not so persuasively argue against the adoption of an IQ
range, the court still likely came to the wrong conclusion in fixing its
range at seventy to seventy-five. The only source cited in support of the
court's decision to adopt an IQ range was an amicus curiae brief filed by
the AAMR 45 According to Justice Chin, the AAMR brief mentions that
most individuals with intellectual functioning problems will fall into a
range of IQ scores between seventy and seventy-five.' 46 By simply citing
the amicus brief without more, the court does not give the full picture of
the AAMR's argument. First, the AAMR points out that strict
adherence to a fixed IQ range does not reflect the current best practice
138. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376.
139. Id.
140. Supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
141. See AAMR MANUAL, supra note 86, at 13.
142. See supra notes 112-36 and accompanying text.
L43. See supra note 129.
144. See Uptak, supra note 133, at 4 (reporting that the defendant in Atkins v. Virginia had
received a number of different IQ scores inside and outside the seventy to seventy-five range because
he had taken the test numerous times).
145. In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4 th 40,52 (2005).
146. Id.
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for identifying someone with low levels of intellectual functioning. 
47
Instead, all evidence affecting an offender's intellectual functioning
should be considered.' 48 Second, the AAMR contends that even when an
IQ range is used to describe subaverage intellectual functioning, the
range should not be fixed in all situations.'49 Determining an appropriate
IQ range should begin with an identification of the score that is two
standard deviations below the mean score for the specific testing
instrument used.'50 That score should represent the general IQ level for
someone with mental retardation. The upper and lower boundaries of
any IQ range may then be determined by assessing the standard error of
measurement for that instrument, as well as any other identifiable
strengths or limitations." '
In deciding to adopt a fixed IQ range of seventy to seventy-five, the
supreme court appears to have taken neither of these arguments
seriously. The court ignored the AAMR's general warning that
intellectual functioning should be determined based on a total
assessment of all evidence which might bear on the issue. And it appears
that in setting a fixed range of seventy to seventy-five regardless of the
instrument used, the court disregarded the AAMR's recommendation
that any IQ range should be tailored to the specific instrument used,
including the standard margin of error for that instrument and any other
identifiable strengths and limitations.
In light of these arguments the Hawthorne court was incorrect in
requiring that an inmate prove that his IQ does not fall above a fixed
range in order to prove subaverage intellectual functioning.
2. Deficiencies in Adaptive Behavior
To prove the second prong of its mental retardation definition, the
court stated that a death row inmate must show limited functioning in
certain basic adaptive skill areas, including "communication, self-care,
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and
safety, functional academics, leisure, and work."'' 2 However, the court
rejected the idea that an inmate must prove a deficit in a minimum
number of these basic skills.'53 Instead, the court held that evidence of a
severe enough limitation in just one of the enumerated categories could
147. Brief of the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) and The ARC of the
United States as Amici Curiae at 6-7, Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4 th 40 (No. S116670).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 7-8.
15o. Id.
151. Id.
152. Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th at 47-48 (citing AAMR MANUAL, supra note 86, and AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS-TEXT
REVISION 41 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter APA, DSM- IV-TRI).
153. Id. at 49.
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be sufficient to support a finding of mental retardation.'54
a. Reasoning Assessment
To support this holding, the court noted that most theoretical
models of mental retardation focus on more than intelligence alone and
instead emphasize the individual's overall capacity.'55  Thus, any
meaningful definition of mental retardation should include an assessment
of an individual's ability to perform basic adaptive skills.' 56 This
reasoning is well-supported.
As briefly mentioned above, a longstanding consensus has existed
amongst clinicians that mental retardation should be conceptualized as a
systemic disability expressed through deficient interactions between a
person with subaverage intelligence and his or her environment.'57
Consequently, the medical community has uniformly required some
proof of an inability to cope with everyday living as part of its
definitions. 58 Beginning in 1936, the president of the AAMR, Dr. Edgar
Doll, set forth what is considered to be the most influential definition of
mental retardation ever developed.' 9 Consistent with the medical
community's accepted conceptualization, Doll defined mental
retardation as a condition of "social incompetence" and began defining it
to include impaired functioning in a number of broad areas, including
socialization, communication, and daily living, as part of any diagnosis.
From that time forward, the AAMR, the APA, and the World Health
Organization (WHO), have all embraced a similar conceptualization and
as a result each group has consistently included a broad assessment of
basic adaptive functioning in its mental retardation definition.
'6
,
Support for Hawthorne's reasoning can also be found in the U.S.
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, which, like the medical community,
seems to have endorsed the concept that mental retardation is more than
just a condition of subaverage intelligence. In Atkins, for instance, the
Court held that a finding of mental retardation was sufficient to exempt




157. See supra note 87 and accompanying text; AAMR MANUAL, supra note 86, at xi.
158. See AAMR MANUAL, supra note 86, at 13, 24.
159. See id. at 80; MARY BEIRNE-SMrrH ET AL., MENTAL RETARDATION 47 (6th ed. 2002) ("Arguably,
Doll's [concept of mental retardation] is the most important.... as it has continued to influence the
defining of the condition.").
16o. See BEIRNE-SMrrH, supra note 159, at 20; Nancy Cantor & John F. Kihlstrom, Social
Intelligence (2ooo), available at http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/-kihlstrm/social-intelligence.htm.
161. See AAMR MANUAL, supra note 86, at 24-25; APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 152, at 4o;
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ICD-Io GUIDE FOR MENTAL RETARDATION I (199
6
) [hereinafter ICD-
io Guide], available at http:/lwhqlibdoc.who.intlhq/t9961WHO-MNHi_96.3.pdf.
162. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002).
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solely on the conclusion that offenders with mental retardation are less
culpable because of their deficient intellect. Instead, the Court's holding
also relied on the fact that the intellectual deficits associated with mental
retardation commonly manifest themselves in an array of real world
impairments.' 63 And it is these impairments which in large part make
imposition of the death penalty against people with mental retardation
unconstitutional. According to the Court, likely deficits in basic skill
areas such as communication, movement, impulse control, and
environmental reactivity render a person with mental retardation less
susceptible to the principle aims of the death penalty-retribution and
deterrence. 64
In light of the Court's conceptualization of mental retardation-as
well as the medical community's-Hawthorne's reasoning in this area
seems well-supported.
b. Conclusion Assessment
With such persuasive reasoning in mind, the logical choice for the
California Supreme Court should have been to require a death row
inmate to show some evidence of an inability to function normally in his
or her environment. But the court did not quite reach this conclusion,
and instead stated that any evidence offered by the inmate to meet the
second prong of its definition would have to fit into one of several
enumerated adaptive functioning categories.'6" Evidence of a deficiency
beyond "communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community
use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and
work," would not be sufficient to meet the court's definition.' 66 The
court's conclusion in this area was ultimately incorrect.
Requiring an inmate to prove deficiencies in a limited number of
adaptive skill areas is inconsistent with the medical community's current
understanding and approach to the mental retardation condition.
According to current research, a person with mental retardation may
express his or her inability to cope with everyday living in an untold
number of ways.' 67 Thus, the medical community has consistently
endorsed a definition of mental retardation that allows for proof of
impairments in a variety of global skill categories, rather than requiring
evidence of limitations in certain finite areas. 's For example, the 2002
163. Id. at 318.
164. Id.
165. In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th 40,48 (2005).
i66. See id.
167. See AAMR MANUAL, supra note 86, at 41-43; GEORGE S. BAROFF & J. GREGORY OLLEY,
MENTAL RETARDATION: NATURE, CAUSE, AND MANAGEMENT 36-46 (3d ed. 1999).
168. AAMR MANUAL, supra note 86, at 41-43. See also generally Henry Leland, Adaptive
Behavior Scales, in HANDBOOK OF MENTAL RETARDATION (Johnny L. Matson & James L. Mulick eds.,
1983). A common response to this contention will be that the 1992 AAMR definition included a list of
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AAMR definition, considered by many to be the best definition of
mental retardation available, '69  states that mental retardation is
characterized by "significant limitations in ... adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.'. 7 ° The
definition put forth by the World Health Organization is similar, only
requiring the individual to show some deficiency in any one of four broad
adaptive categories, including cognitive skills, language skills, motor
skills, or social abilities.?7 Given this Note's repeated emphasis on the
importance of being consistent with the medical community's current
definition and conceptualization of mental retardation, 17 the Hawthorne
court's conclusion in this area can only be described as incorrect.
The court's decision to require an inmate to conform his proof to a
limited number of adaptive skill categories is also incorrect because it
narrows the number of offenders who could be eligible for Atkins relief.
As discussed above, Atkins created a categorical exemption from the
death penalty for those individuals who possess some adaptive skill
deficiency which makes them immune from the two principle aims of the
death penalty-deterrence and retribution.'73 While proof that an inmate
suffers a deficiency in any of the adaptive skills mentioned in Hawthorne
would almost certainly lead to the conclusion that deterrence and
retribution do not apply,7' the court's list is not exhaustive. The
proposition that a person could possess a deficit in some adaptive skill
area not listed in Hawthorne (e.g., impulse control), but which still
renders the individual undeterrable and less culpable is not subject to
debate.' 75 In denying a death row inmate-who has already shown
adaptive functioning areas almost identical to what is included in Hawthorne. See AAMR MANUAL,
supra note 86, at 41. However, the 1992 manual indicated that this list was included for identification
of support areas only. Id. For identification and classification purposes, the 1992 manual focused on
broader adaptive skill areas. See generally AAMR MANUAL, supra note 86.
169. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 106, at 13 ("The formulation in the 2002 AAMR definition appears
to be... better suited for forensic evaluations in death penalty cases.").
17o. AAMR MANUAL, supra 86, at i.
171. ICD-Io Guide, supra note 161, at 9.
172. See supra notes 98-1o2, 105-o8 and accompanying text.
173. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,319-20 (2002).
174. For example, Atkins noted that a deficiency in communication ability would make an
individual less culpable and less deterrable. Id. This skill area was also included in the enumerated list
set forth in In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th 40, 47-48 (2005).
175. For example, consider the following hypothetical. Joe is a forty-three-year-old male who has
been on California's death row for five years. Joe has undergone several intelligence tests, each of
which results in an IQ score between sixty-three and sixty-five. In 2005, Joe files a habeas petition in
the Superior Court for the County of San Francisco seeking an exemption from his sentence of death
based on Atkins. In addition to offering his IQ scores, Joe submits the following information. Starting
at the age of fourteen, Joe began to run away from home every time he felt sad and in total ran away
more than thirty times. On two of the occasions Joe sexually assaulted a woman. According to Joe,
each of the women, whom he admitted to not knowing, asked him to engage in the sexual encounter.
Finally Joe submits evaluations from several of his elementary school teachers who all note that Joe
smiles incessantly in class.
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subaverage intellect-the right to prove such a deficit, Hawthorne may
withhold an Atkins exemption from someone who could clearly be
eligible for relief.
The obvious conclusion from these two arguments is that the court's
decision to require proof of adaptive functioning deficits in a certain
limited number of categories was incorrect. As Justice Brown's well-
supported reasoning suggests, the court should have taken a broader
approach and required the inmate simply to show some evidence of an
inability to function normally in his or her environment.176
CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion suggests, the Hawthorne court's
definition of mental retardation and rationale for that definition cannot
be singularly categorized as either correct or incorrect. Instead
Hawthorne offers a combination of both positive and negative
contributions to the debate over how to define mental retardation in
Atkins cases.
As I have argued, appellate courts and legislatures struggling with
the definitional issue in the future should look to Hawthorne for
guidance on a number of topics. This includes the court's implicit
conclusion that it should tackle the definitional issue rather than
deferring to the legislature, and the court's decision to adopt a clinical
based definition of mental retardation. Additionally, the court's
discussion of the exact contours of the two essential prongs of mental
retardation - subaverage intelligence and adaptive functioning
limitations-can and should be followed in future opinions.
In contrast, the deficient reasoning and incorrect conclusions
Hawthorne exhibits should be avoided. For instance, a future court
should fill in the gaps left open by the California Supreme Court
reasoning as to why a court should decide the definition issue and why a
clinical based definition of mental retardation is the appropriate choice.
If applied honestly, Joe would not be able to meet the second prong of the Hawthorne court's
mental retardation definition and thus his petition should be denied. None of the evidence submitted
by Joe appears to fit exactly within the adaptive skill areas listed by the court, including
"communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety,
functional academics, leisure, and work." However, the adaptive skill deficiencies highlighted by Joe
would make him eligible for relief under Atkins. As Atkins noted, deficits in impulse control (running
away), environmental reactivity skills (believing women wanted sexual encounters), and motor skills
(incessant smiling) all make an individual less susceptible to the principle deterrence and retribution
aims of the death penalty.
176. One issue with this conclusion which deserves mentioning is that by making the skill
categories too broad the standard would allow inmates to use their criminal behavior as evidence of
adaptive functioning deficiencies. However, this concern can easily be dismissed by the fact that the
inmate would still need to show some manifestation of adaptive functioning problems before the age
of eighteen. See AAMR MANUAL, supra note 86 (detailing the age of onset requirement).
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Some of the persuasive arguments a court might offer have been
articulated above. Finally, no appellate court or legislature should
attempt to mirror Hawthorne's conclusion on what evidence must be
shown in order to prove subaverage intelligence and deficiencies in
adaptive behavior. As I have suggested the correct conclusion should be
to allow a defendant to offer any evidence of subaverage intellectual
functioning and to permit a showing of deficient adaptive behavior in any
number of broad categories as opposed to a finite list.
In conclusion, while some may argue that this Note is too harsh on
Hawthorne and others may argue that it offers too much praise, my only
hope is that it may spark lively debate on an important issue.
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